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ARGUMENT
L

A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION ACCRUES UPON THE BREACH.
NOT WITH THE DAMAGE, SINCE RB&G BREACHED UPON
RENDERING ITS FAULTY REPORTS IN 1993 AND 1995 (BEFORE
DEVELOPMENT CORP. TRANSFERRED ITS INTEREST IN THE RB&G
CONTRACTS TO ENTERPRISES), ENTERPRISES CAN PROPERLY
ASSERT A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST RB&G.
Appellants Sunridge Development Corporation ("Development Corp.") and

Sunridge Enterprises, LLC ("Enterprises") do not take issue with the well-settled
proposition that an assignee "stands in the shoes" of the assignor, or that an assignee
"cannot recover more than the assignor could recover .. . ." SME Indus., Inc. v.
Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs.} Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 676 (Utah 2001) (citation
and quotation omitted). Rather, Development Corp. asserts that since a breach of
contract cause of action accrues upon the breach—not at the time of the damage—
Development Corp. assigned a valid, completed breach of contract cause of action to
Enterprises in 1996.1 Therefore, Enterprises can properly assert its breach of contract
cause of action against RB&G for the lost fourteen units, which would have been
Development Corp. damages. Or, in Appellee RB&G Engineering, Inc's ("RB&G")
terms, both Development Corp. and Enterprises wore a size nine shoe.

1

RB&G uses different cases, including Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co., 608 P.2d 236,
238 (Utah 1980), to argue that an assignee's rights are limited when the assignor assigns
only "a portion of its rights under the contract
" (Br. of Appellee 8.) But it is
undisputed that in this case, Development Corp. assigned all—not just "a portion"—of its
rights under its contracts with RB&G to Enterprises. (R. at 393.) Indeed, subsequent to
the assignment, Development Corp. was no longer a party to the RB&G contract, and
Development Corp. wholly terminated its privity with RB&G. Thus, RB&G's
incongruous arguments and cases are inapposite.
1

A breach of contract requires four essential elements of proof: "(1) a contract, (2)
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other party, and
(4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001).
Generally, a cause of action "accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins
to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action."
Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 114 P.3d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). But this is not
the case with a cause of action for breach of contract: "a contract action ordinarily
accrues at the time of breach." S & GInc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735,
740 (Utah 1996); see also Clarke, 114 P.3d at 603 (holding that a breach of contract
cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the
breach).
The breach of contract actions against RB&G accrued in 1993 and 1995 when
RB&G failed to identify the existing faults on the Alpine Brook property. Thus, at those
moments, Development Corp. could assert breach of contract actions against RB&G for
damages, although the damages were yet undiscovered (hence the delay in asserting the
claim and the reason for applying the "discovery rule," discussed in Section II infra).

Importantly, as though not clear enough, RB&G admitted it breached the
contracts with Development Corp. At the summary judgment hearing, in arguing that
Enterprises could not assert a breach of contract claim against RB&G, its counsel said
"the difference here, your Honor, is the contract was fully performed and breached
before the assignment occurs." (R. at 744, p.52 (emphasis added).) A moment later, he
reiterated, "so when [the contracts were] assigned, [they 're] breached contract[s], " (R.
at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).)
2

Therefore, when Development Corp. transferred to Enterprises all of Development
Corp.'s interest in the two contracts with RB&G, Enterprises could (as the assignee and
successor-in-interest) assert the breach of contract actions against RB&G that
Development Corp. could have asserted. As RB&G rightly pointed out, the assignee
receives just what the assignor had—nothing more, and nothing less.
IL

SINCE DEVELOPMENT CORP./ENTERPRISES DID NOT DISCOVER—
AND COULD NOT HAVE REASONABLY DISCOVERED—RB&G9S
BREACHES UNTIL YEARS LATER, THE COURT SHOULD APPLY THE
"DISCOVERY RULE" TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
Clearly then, and by RB&G's own admission, RB&G breached the contracts with

Development Corp. before the assignment. But Development Corp. did not immediately
bring suit upon discovery of the breaches because Development Corp. did not know
about the breaches until 1998 when the Utah Geological Survey ("UGS") notified
Enterprises of existing faults under the property which necessitated a re-design and which
results in the lost fourteen units. Further, neither Development Corp. nor Enterprises
could have known about the faults until UGS notified them; indeed, Development Corp.
specifically contracted with and relied on RB&G to discover any faults and to avoid this
kind of costly surprise. The Court should apply the "discovery rule" to toll the statute of
limitations, making Development Corp./Enterprises' claims timely filed.
As noted above, a cause of action generally accrues "'upon the happening of the
last event necessary to complete the cause of action.5" Hill v. Alfred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1275
(Utah 2001) (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)); see also Olsen
v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993) (stating that a limitations period "begins to
3

run when the cause of action accrues"). This rule is different for contract actions,
however, with accrual of the action upon the breach. S & G Inc., 913 P.2d at 740.
Therefore, since the statute of limitations for suit upon a written contract is six years,
Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-12-23(2), the statute of limitations would have expired by the
time Development Corp./Enterprises filed their claims in 2003.
But as with most rules of law, "[t]here are a number of exceptions to this general
rule [that a statute of limitations begins to run when the action accrues]." Myers, 635 P.2d
at 86. One such exception is the "discovery rule," which "toll[s] the limitations period
'until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.'" Hill, 25 P.3d at
1275 (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). In other words, applying the discovery rule
prevents the limitations period from beginning to run "until the facts forming the
foundation for the cause of action are discovered" Hill, 25 P.3d at 1275 (emphasis
added); see also Olsen, 865 P.2d at 1348 ("Under the discovery rule, a statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of, the facts that give rise to the cause of
action.").
There are two types of discovery rules: a "statutory discovery rule" and an
"equitable discovery rule," Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), the
latter of which applies in this case. The "equitable discovery rule" applies in two
situations:
(1) where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because
of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct, and
4

(2) where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of
the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904, 910 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted).
This case justifies applying the second rationale of the equitable discovery rule.
Development Corp. hired RB&G to perform not one, but two, esoteric, technical, and
scientific analyses of the Alpine Brook property to determine whether there were
geologic faults that would affect the design of and construction on the property. RB&G
issued the reports, and Development Corp. (and subsequently Enterprises) relied upon
them. Indeed, Development Corp. specifically procured geotechnical reports from
RB&G to avoid any surprises once design and construction began. Yet in 1998, three
years after RB&G's final report, UGS notified Enterprises of the faults that existed on the
property and that Enterprises had to complete a re-design to compensate for the existing
faults. This re-design resulted in the lost fourteen units and a loss of more than a million
dollars for Development Corp./Enterprises.
If the Court refuses to apply the equitable discovery rule in this case, it would
work an injustice on Development Corp. and Enterprises. They had no reason to know
of, and had no ability to discover, RB&G's breaches and the damages therefrom until
UGS notified Enterprises in 1998 of the faults that RB&G had missed. Indeed,
Development Corp. contracted with RB&G precisely to avoid this kind of costly surprise.
If the Court does not apply the discovery rule, it is implying Development Corp. should
have engaged another geotechnical firm to verify RB&G's analyses and reports so that
5

Development Corp. could have discovered RB&G's breaches immediately after it issued
its reports. This is an illogical, inequitable expectation.
The lost fourteen units are a "latent injury," as discussed in Christiansen v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., where this Court applied the discovery rule to toll a statute of limitations
period when the plaintiff did not know or have reason to know "of the existence and
cause of the injury which is the basis of his action." 136 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Utah 2006).
Just as in Christiansen, Development Corp. and Enterprises did not know, and had no
reason to know, of the existence of the cause of injury (or the injury itself) until 1998.
Thus, the Court should apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in this
case.
Moreover, in Myers, the Utah Supreme Court applied the discovery rule to toll a
statute of limitations because "the plaintiffs were unaware of the facts giving rise to their
cause of action." Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. Similarly, in this case, neither Development
Corp. nor Enterprises was aware of RB&G's breaches until UGS informed Enterprises in
1998 of the faults on the property that RB&G missed, which resulted in the lost fourteen
units. Everything to satisfy a cause of action had occurred—it was just a question of
when Development Corp./Enterprises discovered it. Or, in the Utah Supreme Court's
language, this Court should apply the discovery rule and toll the statute of limitations
because "[Development Corp./Enterprises] were unaware of the facts giving rise to their
cause of action." Therefore, the statute of limitations should not have begun until
Enterprises learned of RB&G's breaches in 1998 from UGS.
6

The Olsen case clearly establishes that "a statute of limitations does not begin to
run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
learned of, the facts that give rise to the cause of action." 865 P.2d at 1348. Since
neither Development Corp. nor Enterprises learned of (or could have learned of) RB&G's
breaches until UGS notified Enterprises in 1998 of the existing faults, the statute of
limitations did not begin to run until then. Thus, Enterprises5 breach of contract claim
was timely filed.
HI.

UNDER THE SME CASE, ENTERPRISES CAN RECOVER FOR THE
LOST 14 UNITS BECAUSE THOSE DAMAGES BELONGED TO
DEVELOPMENT CORP, WHEN IT ASSIGNED ITS INTEREST IN THE
RB&G CONTRACTS TO ENTERPRISES IN 1998.
In its opening brief, Development Corp./Enterprises adequately addressed how

SME is different from the instant case, so they need not re-state that lengthy argument.
The crux of the SME case is this: in SME, the assignee's recovery was limited to
the assignor's damages ($150,000) because the assignor had already incurred those
damages by settling for $150,000.3 The assignor effectively capped the damages the
assignee could recover by settling with the breaching party, thus incurring damages in the
amount of $ 150,000. The assignee could not recover more than $ 150,000 from the

RB&G concedes this important point in its brief, but then argues it is an
"assumption" in the SME opinion. (Br. of Appellee 13.) Development
Corp./Enterprises' view on this point is the most logical, reasonable reading of the SME
opinion. The assignee's damages were limited to $150,000 because the assignor had
already settled for $150,000 prior to the assignment. The proposition is neither
complicated nor a stretch of the SME opinion.
7

breaching party because $150,000 is the amount that the assignor actually recovered from
the breaching party—nothing more.
Therefore, Enterprises does not take issue with the general proposition that an
assignee cannot recover more than the assignor could recover. But in the instant case, by
virtue of (1) the breach of contract action accruing in 1993 and 1995 upon breach, (2) the
absence of an artificial cap on Development Corp.'s damages (as there was for the
assignor in SME), and (3) the privity between Enterprises and RB&G, Enterprises can
recover for the lost fourteen units. Any other conclusion would sequester RB&G's
liability for its conceded breaches of the 1993 and 1995 contracts in a legal black hole,
permitting no party to recover for the damages caused by the breaches, which position
RB&G espouses in its brief by attributing RB&G's absence of liability on Development
Corp.'s assignment to Enterprises.
Moreover, Enterprises is not trying to recover more than Development Corp. could
have recovered. Enterprises is trying to recover the same damages Development Corp.
would have recovered but for the assignment to Enterprises.4 RB&G should not be able

RB&G argues that since Development Corp. originally asserted its own claim for
breach of contract, Enterprises cannot assert and win on the same claim. (Br. of Appellee
12-13.) This is a nonsensical argument. Development Corp. did initially assert a breach
of contact claim against RB&G, but pursuant to the trial court's ruling on the second
motion for summary judgment, the court held that Development Corp. lacked proof of
damages, and the claim failed. (R. at 700-04.) If the trial court was correct, the only
other party that could have possibly suffered those damages is Enterprises. And due to
the privity between Enterprises and RB&G pursuant to the assignment, Enterprises is the
proper party to assert and recover on the breach of contract claim.
8

to skirt liability for its breaches based on its contrived reading of the SME case and based
on the assignment to Enterprises.
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court misapplied the SME case,
thereby precluding Enterprises from recovering for RB&G's admitted breaches of the
1993 and 1995 contracts. Alternatively, at a minimum, there exist genuine issues of
material facts whether Enterprises can recover for the lost fourteen units based on
RB&G's breach. Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of partial
summary judgment.
IY,

ALTERNATIVELY, DEVELOPMENT CORP. SUFFERED THE
DAMAGES BEFORE THE ASSIGNMENT TO ENTERPRISES BY
RELYING ON RB&G'S REPORTS. THEREFORE, THE ASSIGNMENT
IN 1996 ENCOMPASSED ALL FOUR ELEMENTS OF ENTERPRISES'
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM.
In the alternative, Development Corp. asserts that it was damaged before the

assignment of the RB&G contract to Enterprises in 1996. Therefore, all the elements of a
breach of contract action were satisfied while Development Corp. was a party to the
RB&G contract. As a result, the subsequent assignment to Enterprises transferred the
completed breach of contract cause of action, thus, Enterprises can recover for the lost
fourteen units.
A.

All Four Elements for a Breach of Contract Cause of Action Were Satisfied
Before the Assignment to Enterprises. Therefore, the Assignment
Transferred Development Corp.'s Contractual Right to Recover for the Lost
14 Units to Enterprises.

A breach of contract requires four essential elements of proof: "(1) a contract, (2)
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other party, and
9

(4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001). In this case,
all four elements were satisfied as to Development. RB&G and Development Corp.
clearly had a contract for services in both 1993 and 1995. (R. at 369-70.) Development
Corp. performed by paying for RB&G's services. (R. at 369-71.) RB&G breached by
failing to identify the faults that the Utah Geological Survey ultimately discovered. (R. at
369-71.) (RB&G also admitted it breached the contract. R. at (R. at 744, p. 52.) And
Development Corp. incurred damages once it relied on RB&G's report and proceeded to
develop the Alpine Brook property, including designing the property, laying roads,
installing utilities, and transferring the Alpine Brook project to another entity (i.e.,
Enterprises). (R. at 375-76.)
All the elements of the breach of contract cause of action occurred while
Development Corp. was still a party to the contract with RB&G. So when Development
Corp. assigned its interest in the contract to Enterprises, it assigned that completed cause
of action. Thus, Enterprises received precisely what Development Corp. had, allowing
Enterprises to sue RB&G for breach of contract.
R

The Breach of Contract Cause of Action Accrued Once Enterprises
Discovered It, Which Was Subsequent to the Assignment From
Development Corp.

Although the elements for the breach of contract cause of action were met while
Development Corp. was a party to the contract with RB&G, under the "discovery rule,"
that cause of action did not accrue until it was discovered, which occurred in 1998 when

10

UGS notified Enterprises that faults existed on the property. Only then did the statute of
limitations begin to run on the breach of contract claim.
In support of this alternative argument, Development Corp./Enterprises
incorporates and applies the discussion of the "discovery rule" from Section II supra.
V.

DEVELOPMENT CORP, AND ENTERPRISES ARE NOT
"DISREGARDHNG1 THE CORPORATE FORM/ 9
RB&G cites inapposite cases and principles dealing with corporate stock and

corporate share holders to argue Development Corp. and Enterprises are "disregarding]
the corporate form for some purposes, but observing] it when it is convenient to do so."
(Br. of Appellee 14.) This is a weak argument and a red herring, and the scant treatment
RB&G gives it in its brief reflects such.
In his deposition, Steven Stewart, the principal of both Development Corp. and
Enterprises, testified that his attorneys told him "liability exposure would be less with an
LLC" (r. at 268), thus, he organized Enterprises, a Utah limited liability corporation, in
1996. Steward did not create Enterprises for any fraudulent, improper, or illegal purpose.
He engaged in a commonplace business practice of organizing a limited liability
company to take advantage of its legal status. Neither has Mr. Stewart sporadically
observed corporate form for these two entities. Rather, they were, and always have been,
distinct legal entities. Development Corp. assigned its interest in the RB&G contracts to
Enterprises to take advantage of the legal benefits of an LLC, not to "avoid liabilities."
(Br. of Appellee 14.) This everyday, routine business re-organization should not

11

preclude Development Corp./Enterprises from asserting their claims against RB&G for
negligence and its admitted breaches.
VL

DEVELOPMENT CORP.'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IS PROPERLY PART
OF THIS APPEAL, AS THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY HELD IN
ITS RULING ON THE FIRST SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT THE
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE BARRED DEVELOPMENT CORP.'S
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM.
In further effort to avoid any liability whatsoever for its negligence and conceded

breaches, RB&G argues that Development Corp.'s negligence claims are not properly
before the Court. But this is contrary to the record.
On March 9, 2005, RB&G moved for summary judgment and partial summary
judgment. (R. at 366.) In that motion, RB&G specifically argued that the economic loss
rule barred Development Corp.'s and Enterprises negligence claims. (R. at 235-238.)
Then, in Development Corp./Enterprises5 opposition, they directly addressed those
arguments, asserting that the economic loss rule did not bar the negligence claims. (R. at
384-387.) In RB&G's reply brief, it not only dealt with the economic loss rule, but it
expressly addressed whether RB&G owed Development Corp./Enterprises an
independent duty (r. at 501-504), for which Development Corp./Enterprises now argues.
In an August 2, 2005 ruling the trial court focused on the parties' discussion of the
negligence claims and the application of the economic loss rule. In its ruling, the Court
wrote "that the economic loss rule holds that economic losses are not recoverable in
negligence absent physical damage or bodily injury. . . . The Court, therefore, for the

12

reasons stated in [RB&G's] memoranda, finds that [Development Corp.'s] and
[Enterprises'] negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule." (R. at 539.)
Subsequently, the parties stipulated that the first motion for summary judgment
ruling from August 2, 2005 (the one addressed above) was appealable.5 (R. at 737-38.)
Thus, Development Corp.'s negligence claim was not subject to the waiver of appeal, and
it is squarely before the Court.
VII

THIS COURT SHOULD EXEMPT ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALS
FROM THE "EVER-EXPANDING, ALL CONSUMING," "SWELLING
GLOBULE"6 THAT IS THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE.
In its opening brief, Development Corp. thoroughly laid out its arguments with

respect to why the economic loss rule should not apply to engineering professionals like
RB&G, so Development Corp. will not restate those arguments here. A few points,
however, are worth addressing in light of RB&G's arguments.
A.

Development Corp., Not Enterprises, Is Asserting a Negligence Claim.

RB&G is confused as to which Appellant is asserting the negligence claim.
RB&G argues that since Enterprises is not a party to the contracts with RB&G (which in
any event is inaccurate, since it is the assignee on those contracts), it cannot assert a tort

5

As RB&G recognizes, the parties stipulated that Development Corp. and
Enterprises would not appeal the second motion for summary judgment, which
stipulation Development Corp. and Enterprises adheres to today. The second motion for
summary judgment is not at issue in this appeal. RB&G's argument is a red herring.
6
These quotes are attributable to Justice Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
as cited in 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 841 (Wis.
2006) (Bradley, J. dissenting) (quoting Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180
(Wis. 2005)).
13

claim for economic damages. (Br. of Appellee 17.) But Enterprises is not asserting a
negligence tort claim—Development Corp. is. Thus, RB&G's argument is not on point.
R

As Numerous Other Jurisdictions Have Found, a Special Relationship
Exists Between Engineering Professionals and Their Clients.

As noted in Development Corp.'s opening brief, numerous other jurisdictions have
recognized the limit of the ever-expanding economic loss rule. This Court has the power
to interpret existing case law, including that from the Utah Supreme Court, and fashion
law and remedies accordingly. Development Corp. is not asking this Court to exceed its
authority or to ignore stare decisis. The Utah Supreme Court has held that some
professionals owe an independent tort duty to their clients, and it is an open question
whether professional engineers are in that group. It is perfectly within this Court's
authority to speak to that issue.
A special relationship exists between professional engineers and their clients in
part due to information asymmetry and because other parties rely on the engineers'
purported expertise and conclusions. Just as with a real estate broker and his or her
clients, a surveyor and his or her clients, and builders-developers and their clients, the
Utah Supreme Court has not been reluctant to find a special relationship and preclude
application of the economic loss rule where there is a duty to be "competent" in a
professional's relationship with his or her client. Hennansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235,
241 (Utah 2002).

For clarity, Development Corp. asks that this Court preclude application of the
economic loss rule only where parties' risk is not allocated by contract, which is the case
14

This is precisely the case here. Development Corp. hired and relied upon RB&G
to conduct an analysis of the Alpine Brook property. RB&G's negligence and breaches
resulted in damages that it knew would affect not only Development Corp.8 (or its
successor-in-interest, Enterprises), but others, like the would-be homeowners. Indeed,
the foreseeability professional engineers have with respect to damages should they
negligently perform their duties is one unique feature of engineers that gives rise to an
independent duty, which is especially prominent in the instant case. In other words,
engineers can foresee that their clients will suffer Herculean financial harm if the
engineers' tests, analyses, and reports are flawed due to negligence on the engineers' part.
As engineers are often involved at the beginning of a development, as RB&G was here,
the engineers know their clients rely upon them for professional, competent advice with
respect to development design and construction. If the engineers are negligent, they
know their clients will suffer the financial consequences.
Moreover, Utah courts have found that parties subject to a special relationship do
not always allocate their risk with contracts. West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 139 P.3d
1059, 1064 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). In a particularly instructive and analogous case (which

here. Pursuant to the assignment from Development Corp. to Enterprises of
Development Corp.'s interest in the contracts with RB&G, Development Corp. retained
no interest in those contracts and lost privity with RB&G.
8
Specifically, RB&G should be keenly aware of its duties to third parties. In
Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel! Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah
1986), RB&G (there styled as "Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc.") argued that based on a
lack of contractual privity, it could not be liable for its negligence. The Court ultimately
found a special relationship between a surveyor and third parties despite lack of
contractual privity.
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RB&G barely addresses because of its harm to RB&G's position), the Utah Supreme
Court found a "special relationship" between an accountant and a third party despite the
lack of contractual privity, thereby subjecting the accountant to economic damage in spite
of the economic loss rule. Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). The
supreme court went on to hold that a third party could maintain a negligence action
against an accountant where the third party relied on the accountant's report and where
the accountant knew that the party would rely on the report for a particular purpose. Id.
at 808. Speaking to privity between the parties, the court clarified that "lack of privity is
not a defense where an accountant... is aware of the fact that his work will be relied on
by a party or parties .. . ." Id.
Milliner is relevant to the instant case because the accountant knew the party
would rely upon his report, just as in our case, RB&G knew Development Corp. and/or
Enterprises and other parties (like subcontractors, the city, and homeowners) would rely
upon RB&G's two reports. And privity or not (although Development Corp. does not ask
this Court to permit tort recovery when an engineer is in privity with the injured party),
the Utah Supreme Court suggests that where a professional knows that a party—even a
third party, in Milliner's case—will rely upon the professional's report for a particular
purpose, that party can assert a negligence claim against the professional because a
"special relationship" exists.
As discussed in Development Corp./Enterprises' opening brief, Utah courts have
found a "special relationship" between other parties as well. There is a "special
16

relationship" between builder-developers and their customers, even though those parties
typically allocate their risk by contract. Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P.3d 283,
287 (Utah 2006). And as noted above, there is a "special relationship" between surveyor
and third parties, despite lack of privity of contract. Price-Orem Investment Co. v.
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986).
Additionally, in Hermansen v. Tasulis, the Utah Supreme Court found a special
relationship between real estate brokers and their clients. 48 P.3d 235, 241 (Utah 2002).
In finding the "special relationship" in Hermansen, the court reasoned that a real estate
agent owes a duty, independent of any express or implied contract, "to be honest, ethical,
and competent" in his or her relationship with the client. Id. Real estate professionals
cannot, the court held, breach their duty to be competent, and not be liable for their
actions. Id.
Similarly, engineering professionals occupy a comparable status in their industry.
Companies and individuals wholly rely upon engineering professionals to provide
accurate, complete, competent advice and reports. To the extent engineering
professionals fail that standard, they must be held accountable for the consequences.
Nineteen other jurisdictions in all have exempted professionals, including
engineers, architects, and design professionals, from the protection of the economic loss
rule based on the professionals' foreseeability of the damages and on the injured party's
reliance on the professional's expertise and knowledge, about which the professional is
aware. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
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Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington, and the
relevant cases from these jurisdictions are laid out in Appellants' opening brief.
RB&G has not addressed these jurisdictions' persuasive arguments for refusing to
apply the economic loss rule to professionals like engineers, but rather, chose to argue
"vertical stare decisis" and "horizontal stare decisis" to persuade this Court not to follow
its sister courts. These nineteen jurisdictions wisely limited this swelling exception that
would swallow tort law entirely, and Utah courts should do the same.
C.

RB&G Cannot Argue the Contradiction that the Court Should Award
Contract Damages, Then Argue the Court Should Award Tort Damages,
When RB&G Disclaims ALL Damages.

In the section of its brief arguing in favor of the economic loss rule to insulate
RB&G from liability, it writes that "any damages are traceable solely to the reports and
RB&G's contractual obligations." (Br. of Appellee 20.) It also states that
"[Development Corp.'s] remedy is a breach of contract claim." (Br. of Appellee 23.)
But earlier in its brief, RB&G argued that Development Corp./Enterprises cannot recover
contract damages due to the assignment. (Br. of Appellee 8-14.)
RB&G argues these contradictions without admitting their illogical, inequitable
conclusions: that RB&G will completely avoid liability for its negligence and breaches of
contract if the Court precludes Development Corp. and Enterprises from recovering. This
Court should hold RB&G responsible for its negligence and breaches of the two
contracts.
18

D.

Professional Engineering Firms Should Be Exempt From the Protection of
the Economic Loss Rule Due, In Part, To Circumstances Like This One.

In addition to the numerous reasons laid out in Development Corp.'s opening brief
as to why professional engineering firms like RB&G should be exempt from the
economic loss rule, this case presents another reason. But for the assignment from
Development Corp. to Enterprises, this case would not be in this Court. There would be
no question that RB&G breached its contracts with Development Corp., and
Development Corp. would be recovering contract damages under those contracts.
But that did not occur here. A common place corporate reorganization by
Development Corp. and the assignment to Enterprises potentially sequestered RB&G's
breaches and negligence in a legal black hole from which no party could recover
damages.
The Court should not permit professional engineers, to whom clients turn for
technical expertise, to avoid liability based on as unrelated business decision by one of its
clients.
CONCLUSION
Development Corp. and Enterprises respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the trial court and, based on the foregoing, find disputed issues of material facts. It
cannot be the case that RB&G's arguments win the day. That result would make RB&G
immune from its negligence and its conceded breaches, which is neither equitable nor
adhering to existing law on assignments, privity, breach of contract actions, or the
economic loss rule. Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial court, allow Enterprises
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to recover for the lost fourteen units, and refuse to shield RB&G's negligence (as to
Development Corp.) with the economic loss rule.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of July 2007.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.
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Charles L. PerschoY
Attorneys for Plainhffs/Appellants
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